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**Some Aspects of Korean Acculturation and
Value Orientation Since 1950**

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Today the anthropologist interested in a comprehensive understanding of culture change and acculturation in Korea, is faced with a rather formidable task. Unlike his parent-generation of anthropologists, he no longer is able to study any single well defined circumscribed entity like an isolated or self-contained tribe. Rather he must deal in a conceptual as well as operational manner with a complex industrializing, modernizing, nation state. Not only is the accumulated literature on Korea, in Western languages especially, scanty to say the least but also in the literature that does exist there is surprising little clarity relevant to studies of culture change and/or acculturation. In the past studies of culture change in general, and those on Korean culture change, in particular, have used for the most part normative cultural concepts; that is, the problem of change in structure as well as in content resulting from contact with the West in general and the United States in particular was often considered as a problem of simple cultural dynamics. Terms such as "diffusion," "reception," "as simulation," "conflict," and the like were used for analytical purposes. These concepts however, are highly abstract, and in essence analyze a process taking place in time and space, the unit of the analyst being most often a culture trait, rather than focusing on processes and resulting changes in configuration. The insufficiencies of standard acculturation theory and method lie perhaps in the fact that there is still lacking a truly conceptual scheme which will permit systematic inclusion, in the acculturative process, of human needs, aspirations, motivations and institutional variation in behavior. There still exists in the literature relatively few meaningful explanations as to why a particular complex of patterns or traits has been incorporated in certain ways in a recipient culture. Or why another overtly similar pattern has been rejected. Once such a conceptual scheme has been introduced, culture change and acculturation research as such may merge with a more general inquiry into the dynamics of institutional and behavioral change in any society at any time, under a variety of conditions.

The Korean War and the subsequent extensive involvement of the United States in Korea have not only brought about changes in the pattern and fabric of traditional Korean life, but also have intensified and accelerated contact with the West. Culture traits from the donor, the West in general and the United States in particular, are and have been integrated into the existing system without really seriously unbalancing the system, though these accretions in the eyes of both Koreans and Westerners produce a peculiar flavor of often overtly irreconcilable contradictions. Many aspects of Western technology introduced within the last century and other features of Western socio-economic relations which Korea has acquired or is acquiring, may be treated as ideological problems of an individual perspective. Here, as in other acculturational situations, as "new choices" are introduced, the individual faces a new situation, and makes new choices in response to these new situations.

In Korea, the aftermath of the Korean War meant that a sizable number of

some 50,000 Americans have come into daily contact with Koreans. These relations between them were no longer confined to the limited social contacts of the historical past or even the occupation era to 1948, but involved now virtually every major sector of the Korean society and economy. In addition this acculturation situation was intensified in one direction by the fact that the direction and guidance which the United States has provided to the Republic of Korea has been viewed by some individuals as a "forced acculturation" where the donor culture set the theme and pace of acculturation, and exposed one particular American element—the U.S. soldier to the Korean society. An important difference in the historical process of the modernization of Europe and a country like Korea, lies in the fact that in the latter the changes were perhaps not so much a matter of social and economic evolution as they were the products of governmental planning and decision-making taking place within one generation, in addition to the intensive pressures of a Civil War and the disfunctional separation of the Korean peninsula into two non-self sufficient parts. The aspirations of the individual Korean under the strong influence of acculturative processes, are today often not in concert with the everyday realities of Korean primary human relations. These relations therefore require continued and often rapid readjustment in order that the social system may operate even at a minimal functional level. It could be said, that the Korean social organization today operates as well as it does, precisely because individuals are both consciously and unconsciously attempting to remedy or to utilize the asymmetry of aspirations and of the structural arrangements in the society as a whole.

When in the post World War II period and since the Korean War, political, social, and economic reforms were enacted by three successive highly centralized regimes, the choices for the individual Korean, though greatly increased as compared with pre-1954, nevertheless remained due to the inflexibility of the traditional Korean family system and its associated value patterns. However with the advent of a New Constitution (1948) and subsequent modifications thereof, and a new Civil Code (promulgated in February 1958) the choices of the individual Korean could fall now on a new and somewhat increased range of alternatives. Activities took new directions and formed new combinations. An important factor in a study focusing on culture change in Korea, is the fact that the presentation of new choices now has become legally sanctioned. This fact has resulted not only in an increased willingness to try formerly unacceptable rearrangements of primary social relations (i.e., role of wife, mate selection, husband-wife relations, dominance-submission patterns, age-status behavior, etc.) but also has meant that new patterns in which the decision-making process has been transferred somewhat from the extended family and the parents to the subordinate generation. Where formerly the power and status orientation centered on decision-making processes on the top, now there exists a beginning of belief in shared decision-making. The foci of past-time orientation are gradually being infiltrated by the future-time considerations of the West.

It is well known that acculturation occurs earliest and is most visible in large urban centers. However, in Korea today modernization in terms of additional choices of behavioral patterns is no longer restricted primarily to the urban centers but conceptual patterns influencing the actions and the world view of the rural Korean are disseminated from "boomtowns" surrounding U.S. installations in the rural areas as well. These are localities whose economic structure, if not their very existence, is intimately tied to the U.S. installations. It has been conjectured that the influences of

these centers of rapid and intense acculturation are most often negative ones. However, we should note that in the very essence of the intensity and the extent of intimate culture contact between the Korean and the U.S. service-man these boomtowns become microcosms of ongoing acculturation duplicated in other urban and rural areas at an often much slower rate. The structural change, and the additional availability of alternate patterns of behavior, of food habits, of dress of higher economic aspirations, of new sexual practices and changed moral attitudes, and of a pronounced "Drang nach einer besseren Zukunft" are the products of social interaction in which pressures are felt, advantages perceived, responsibilities recognized. There exists today in Korea a pronounced conscious effort on the part of many individuals to rearrange the formerly strictly hierarchical patterns into a more flexible, more universalistic framework of inter-personal relations.

One population segment that has come into close and continuous contact with Americans, and thus may provide us with at least some insight into the processes of reformulation of such relations are the Special Entertainers (Yanggongju) living in the boomtowns. Among them acculturation is often more rapid, more visible than among the population-at-large. Boomtowns in Korea, as in other parts of the world where they have come into existence around U.S. installations are primarily opportunistic communities. Thus the change from formerly traditional Korean farm communities to communities now nearly exclusively engaged in buying and selling transactions with military personnel, is an example where a whole range of now economic and social developments is compressed into one area within a relatively short period of time. The principle goods and services are laundry, car washing and painting, beauty shops, bath houses, souvenirs, food, beer, etc. and the services of "Special Entertainers." For a majority of American military personnel in Korea the contacts between the Korean community and the American soldier are mediated through the Boomtown, and often it appears that neither the U.S. authorities nor the authorities from more traditional non-boom communities show much desire for direct contact between the two cultures. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that the Boomtown in Korea may well be conceived as a "buffer community" in which compromises between the two cultures are reached and in which fusion of two patterns takes place. New choices are accepted or rejected before they are passed on to other less acculturated communities.

It is interesting to note that although "Special Entertainers" overtly are that element in the population that has modernized very rapidly, and though perhaps precisely because of their social marginality they have a greater freedom of choice in accepting new socio-behavioral patterns, it was found that they in their value primary orientation do not really significantly differ from the comparable age-group in the population-at-large. However, they are more receptive to adopt more overt changes in terms of material traits since this is in their best economic interest. The Korean community as a whole generally directs criticism most strongly against Korean girls who are in close, direct, continuous contact with military or even non-military non-Korean individuals, rather than directing this criticism against the foreigner or against the more exploitive elements in boomtowns. This is in concert with directing hostility towards the least threatening person as a scapegoat. On the Korean side there exists almost universal agreement that intense and very rapid acculturation, in which the donor culture is seen as forcing "undesirable modern patterns" on the recipient culture. Furthermore though some elements in the Korean population disapprove of "disorders" and "difficulties" created by Boomtown acculturation, not all elements disap-

prove of Boomtown in itself and altogether. It appears clearly that only a negligible segment of the Korean or the U.S. military authorities altogether disapprove of Boomtowns; rather most authorities from all groups accept the fact of their existence and concentrate their attention on various aspects of "disorder" and "undesirable" acculturation. This tacit approval may well be understood to mean that Boomtowns have a definite functional usefulness to both the Korean as well as to the U.S. authorities.

The general agreement of opinion as to Bisapproval of Boomtowns as well as of the "Special Entertainers" as contaminating agents of acceptable Korean social behavior hides the fact that various Korean authority groups have somewhat different reasons for their negative attitudes. Provincial authorities see in Boomtowns "moral disorder and a marked decline of Korean morals". They note with some concern the economic dependence of whole Korean communities on U.S. military culture. The *gun* and *myon* authorities tend to dislike the extreme mercenary aspects noticeable in the economic activities of the Boomtown entrepreneurs. The Boomtown authorities themselves perceive the excessive number of business establishments and "Special Entertainers as disorderly: to mean, consequent low profit to each individual involved. Furthermore Boomtown authorities feel strongly the ambiguity of political and police control over the community. And lastly the negative U.S. military reaction to Boomtowns stems largely from their statistics and volumes of written reports concerned with incidents involving U.S. personnel as to prostitution, venereal disease, black market activities, etc. One might expect that each nationality group would blame the disorders of these localities on the other group, but this holds not necessarily true. A majority opinion seems to blame the Koreans for the negative features in Boomtowns. Some Koreans of course, hold U.S. authorities responsible for the negative situation. In general, U.S. authorities do not feel overly concerned with the overall aspects of "forced acculturation," however, it must be stated that U.S. authorities are positively concerned with public health and other social problems arising out of this intense culture contact situation.

A most negative feature, as perceived by Koreans and U.S. authorities as well, involves cross-cultural contacts in which heterosexual contacts are primary. Neither the authorities in the recipient or the donor culture are strong in their belief that heterosexual friendships which involves "going out together publicly," are very possible under existing conditions in Korea. Relationships in which the congeniality of personalities is more important than overt sexual activities, and in which at least during the early stages of the relationship, there is no sexual intercourse, are thought improbable. Hostility towards "Special Entertainers" and perhaps the majority of female Korean nationals seen with a non-Korean are taken as such, is an expression of the strong disapproval of any sexual, non-commercial, relation with a non-Korean or any public display of affection that could lead to such a non-commercial sexual relation. The Koreans do not disapprove of sexual relations as such, they recognize and approve of prostitution which under present legal statutes is not a crime in and of itself, nor is it a crime for an unmarried Korean male to have coitus with a prostitute or an unmarried female. Article of the Criminal Code specifies further that in cases of adultery both participants may be sentenced to penal servitude for not more than two years, but only upon complaint of the injured spouse." Koreans traditionally did disapprove of mixing sexual relations with friendship or pre-marital courtship. These attitudes are not only changing more rapidly within the context of those Korean

females having close and intense contact with Americans but also in the population-at-large. But certainly these newly emerging social, as well as sexual practices, are most noticeable and most discussed in across-cultural rather than intra-cultural context. We may generalise certain aspects of this change of value orientation typified by "Special Entertainers" in saying that one of the primary values in interpersonal relations for the Korean was the isolation and definite distinctions made between various functional types of relationships. A primary American and Western value infused very rapidly in an intense acculturative context is reciprocity or mutuality in kind, sexual interest being reciprocated with sexual interest, respect reciprocated with respect, romantic love with romantic love. Thus, Americans may often disapprove those aspects which are valued most by the traditionally oriented Korean. Americans may disapprove of professional prostitution, (which in Boomtowns may be most easily controlled) as an exchange of money for sex, instead of sexual feelings for sexual feelings or desire. Americans generally disapprove of marriages of convenience, which exchanged respect, friendship and economic advantages for "love" rather than love for love. Americans have succeeded in acculturating segments of the younger Korean age groups that public display of courtship is not undesirable. Americans are also somewhat less concerned as to whether sex in an initial relationship is involved or not. What they generally are very much concerned with, is with whatever one party to such a relationship desires of the other, and this should be reciprocated in kind by the other party. Some Koreans are now forced to admit that new categories of heterosexual relationships, including the American "dating patterns" which is a mixture of friendship, sexual interest. This pattern has made considerable inroads not only among "Special Entertainers" but also among the "nice" element of Korean womanhood. On the other hand, some Americans in Korea have been forced to admit a new category of relationship, that of a "Steady" (a relationship of a Special Entertainer to one individual lasting for 6 or 12 months) which includes mixed feelings of sexuality and nurturance, and in which many exchanges of unlike take place—the exchange of economic considerations (access to P.X. commodities)—and money for sex. This represents an often immature affection for nurturant care and so on, rather than being a mutual reciprocation of similar interests and feelings in a more romantic sense, on both sides of the relationship.

As stated earlier, most Koreans, individuals as well as authority groups tend to combine together prostitutes, waitresses, bar-girls, mistresses, and friends as "Special Entertainers." The Korean is very perceptive of the identity of *Yanggongju* (Western princess), and of their differences from the ordinary Korean girl. Americans are often unaware of the fact that the Korean makes much of the differences in dress, behavior, and amounts of money among these girls when compared with the ordinary Korean. The demands of the two cultures most primarily involved regarding mutuality in heterosexual relationships are quite different. Koreans often state that the "Special Entertainers" need money and the American needs sex, both of which needs are regarded generally by the Korean as legitimate. In fact then, the Korean seems to approve of the exchange of sex for money, but he insists that this should be labelled "professional prostitution." Americans in general and U.S. authorities in particular, however, ideally insist frequently that mutuality be in kind. It seems then that American culture tends to value a purely economic exchange relationship less than it values a moral equivalence relationship. The result in terms of value re-orientation in Korea today is, that in terms of acceptable "ideal values" the young Korean

girl feels as does her American sister, that she must be romantically in love with the man before she can marry him or agree to a more intimate relationship.

Whereas in the traditional Korean extended family system the female derived her emotional dependence gratification and her social status from her position in the social structure, the young Korean female now often seeks for a modernized" romantic element in her partner hitherto only ideally aspired to.

This interphase of values in the Boomtown means that ambiguity features, tied to the partial acceptance as well as partial rejection of new sexual standards in a segment of the Korean population, are raised to a high level. But it also means that the society-at-large must eventually make new choices.

The Korean authorities in Boomtowns in many instances take a more flatly realistic and factual view of the role of "Special Entertainers" than do the American authorities, since moral issues are not a major consideration in dealing with foreigners. The villagers gives evidence of concerning himself with the essentials of life rather than with legal, moral, and ethical problems involving "outsiders". Korean authorities, especially in rural Boomtowns accept cross-cultural sexual relations as a necessary concomitant of the "outsider's" presence. Where poverty of the girl's family conflicts with her living up to traditional values, and where this fact demands a change in value orientation, the Korean accepts reality and often condones the girl's actions while pitying her for her "misery." At the same time, hostility expressed against her is an expression of a certain envy of her increased economic standards, and overt freedom from responsibility. Higher government levels, Korean as well as American, show a tendency to condemn the girl and only partially admit the factors of a changing value system tied to existing socio-economic facts of life.

Although most Koreans are unaware of the "buffer effect" of Boomtowns and "Special Entertainers" they often agree that the *Yanggongju* function as a protection for the "nice" women of Korea. This conceptualization by the way, is not widely shared by Americans. The true effects of the "Special Entertainers" on the traditional Korean family system still remains largely unknown. However, it can be stated with some assurance that since it appears that Korean families with their strong internal cohesion patterns ultimately seem to accept the status of their daughters and seem to continue their relations with them, acculturation is intensified in a considerable segment of the population. Furthermore, since it can be conjectured that a sizeable number of "Special Entertainers" come from rural families their effect on the rural, more traditional family, may well be of some significance.

In essence, U.S. rational attitudes seem to conclude that Boomtowns and their inhabitants are here to stay for at least the present time, and yet the implicit values which are being introduced by Americans often seek to prevent their very existence. Features of extreme ambiguity in dealing not only with Boomtown and its more undesirable elements and features but also with all issues where an official morality clashes with a private one, may be noticed again and again. The Korean thus is kept uncertain as to what American attitudes "really are. The U.S. stands for economic development, for individual freedom, as long as it doesn't involve any "immoral" features. The institution may be accepted but the resulting changed value system that accompanies it, may not be.

We can conclude, that in spite of all ambiguities, uncertainties, ironies and enigmas contained in acculturation in and outside of Boomtown, this kind of setting is a focus of culture change where acculturation is often more rapid, and more intense

than in the country as a whole. Although the results of change overtly affect only certain segments of the population and only certain communities in the receiving culture, in addition to involving only certain elements of the donor culture, these visible results nevertheless do provide the Korean with a preview of things to come. The changes in value orientation, in economic considerations, in increased aspirations, in social structure, etc. among the inhabitants of Boomtown are a mirror for change of the society as a whole.

DISCUSSION

Dr. Passin: How many special-entertainer-and-American-G.I. situations did you study?

Dr. Moos: Our sample consisted of 108 situations. We studied their backgrounds, education, family connections, motivations, aspirations. We dealt only with those active right now, with only a few exceptions. One interesting feature is that the fruits, or souvenirs, left by the G.I.s who were here in 1945, are now beginning to work along with their mothers. In other words, we have now a second generation of special entertainers.

One aspect of this situation which has not been studied is marriage, though it would be very interesting. The figures for marriages between Korean girls and G.I.s have risen from about 40 in 1946, to 1645 in 1957. The rate has now stabilized at about 1600 a year.

Dr. Roh: Don't you think that there are many other things to be considered besides boom-towns? I'm thinking particularly of the mass-media...

Dr. Moos: Certainly, but what fascinates me about these boom-towns is that the patterns of change there give us, I think, a preview of the future for society in general. I agree that it's a specific kind of acculturation, but the number of individuals involved and the intensity of the situation, is such that we can take it as a mirror of the shape of things to come. I realize that my studies are only a beginning; my purpose was largely to raise some questions for Korean scholars to continue with.

Dr. Okada: How about the acculturation process on the side of American soldiers? How have they been affected by their contact with Koreans?

Dr. Moos: That's a very difficult question to answer, because the American Army has an ambivalent attitude. In some divisions, officers are never allowed out into the community without an M.P. escort, whilst in other units, they are. In still other units, non-commissioned officers are restricted in this way. A case could be made that the American Army exposes its younger, more immature elements, but keeps its older, maturer elements inside. There are cases of individuals who never leave a compound, especially in the areas north of Seoul, during, say, five months. In general, there don't seem to be any significant trends of influence from Koreans on Americans — it's a one-way process.

Dr. Okada: Do many American soldiers here have their families with them?

Dr. Moos: Very few. The overwhelming majority of U.S. soldiers in Korea, about 50,000, are here on a 13-month "hardship tour", and are not eligible to bring their dependents with them.

Dr. Okada: What about the effect on American families of living in Korea?

Dr. Moos: Almost negligible, because they are extremely segregated.

Prof. Kim, K.D.: What about the origins of the special entertainers? How many of them come from the area in which they work?

Dr. Moos: Very few. We found that 72% of the girls working in the Yongsan, Hanamdong area not only do not come from that area, but do not even come from Kyonggido. This is true also in the rural areas.

Dr. Levy: Many Americans stationed abroad

marry local girls and set up something closely equivalent to what they would regard as American family life. What are the evidences for acculturation when this happens? What effects on the Korean community? On the Americans?

Dr. Moos: Not much, because to arrange a marriage normally takes in excess of the time that a G.I. is here. The paper-work may take months and months, partly because the Army authorities are not always too happy about the prospect. So it often happens that if a G.I. wants to marry a Korean girl, he goes home first, then comes back to pick her up; or sends for her. So there is only a statistically insignificant proportion of cases of settled family life between an American soldier and a Korean girl here in Korea.

Dr. Huang: What exactly do you mean by "acculturation".

Dr. Moos: "An intense contact that results in changes in either the donor or recipient culture".

Dr. Huang: But acculturation must ordinarily be based on reciprocity, a cultural interchange.

Dr. Moos: Not necessarily. Acculturation may very well work, as is the case with Korea, mainly in a one-way direction.

Dr. Huang: So, seen from the American side, acculturation might mean having influence on others. And seen from the Korean side, acculturation might mean the losing of what they had before.

Dr. Moos: Yes, each of these is acculturation.

Dr. Huang: In that case, I have nothing to argue with you.

Dr. Passin: My first comment may be related to this question, and also to the one Prof. Roh raised. Obviously there are many different situations in which one culture may influence another. As well as the kind Dr. Moos has mentioned, there are kinds of acculturation that take place indirectly. For example, when a Western-style building goes up, this means that people have to get acquainted with revolving doors, with elevators, with a whole new set of

motions. There is a more propulsive kind of acculturation that comes by way of the mass-media, that is, a general diffusion of new ideas. A further kind of non-personal acculturation comes through books.

Against these non-personal kinds, there are many varieties of acculturation coming from personal-contact situations. The most intense kind is the one Prof. Moos was describing; this is much more than a casual commercial contact. A significant part of the life-space of individuals that is extensively shared; not only do they sleep together, but they eat together, they have to make some kind of a home, make budgetary arrangements...

Dr. Moos: Even more important, they come into close contact with the other elements that you mentioned. Let's take an average country-bred girl, who is suddenly exposed to "the land of the Big P.X." — the movies, the snack-bar, the foodhabits, the Sears and Roebuck catalogue. In rural areas, I would conjecture, the Sears and Roebuck catalogue has been influential in changing aspirations. If I had to bury a time-capsule in Korea, certainly I would include in it a Sears and Roebuck catalogue.

Dr. Levy: It could be the greatest propaganda weapon! To drop a million Sears and Roebuck catalogues on the Soviet-Union, would have a very far-reaching effect.

Dr. Passin: To go back to what I was saying about varieties. The fact, for example, that there are several Westerners teaching at Korean universities cannot be without acculturative effect. There are also diplomatic missions, aid missions, and, more important in Korea, missionaries, who are bound to work largely through personal-contact situations. With regard to all these contacts, it's important to keep in mind several considerations. One is the question of reciprocity; this depends largely on length of time and duration of contact. A second is the area of contact: in some cases it will be on a strictly intellectual level, in others on a much more personal level — these things make a difference. Another aspect to keep in mind is whether a relationship is a relatively equal one or one between subordinate and superior, because this makes a great deal of difference in the outcome.

Now, I would like to raise a challenge and ask whether, in the case of the special entertainers, we are not dealing with something rather more traditional than appears to be the case. The fact that the forms associated with these special entertainers are notably different, doesn't mean that they're necessarily so untraditional. In Eastern societies that provided a special area for masculine indulgence, it was certainly a common pattern for girls from farms, or girls in family difficulties, to move into these occupations at various levels. Even within the framework of their own society, these girls undergo an acculturation with regard to food, clothes, expectations, values. The special entertainers of modern Korea are different in that their clients are Westerners, but in other ways they may be more traditional than we tend to think. A girl may be sacrificing herself for her family, she may be supporting a family — in other words, she may be acting in accordance with filial piety. They're exposed to a new range of stimuli, which are different from the ones the traditional gisaeng encountered, but the principle is very similar.

Dr. Moos: Except in the more traditional aspects, you are primarily dealing not with acculturation, but with internal patterns of growth within the culture. That is, it's intra-cultural rather than cross-cultural.

Dr. Passin: If the differences within a culture are very extreme, then it's a form of, as it were, "intra-cultural acculturation". It's not necessarily a different continuum.

Dr. Levy: Some of the discontinuities are also similar. For example, the higher the level, in terms of social prestige, at which this acculturation takes place, the less likely it is that these girls go back to the environment from which they came. So that, in a sense, it's a one-way thing. Particularly in the modernization situation, the major lines of acculturation are likely to be a one-way street. For example, every one in this room wears clothes which have nothing to do with Korean dress; and only fundamentalistically orientated people are offended by this. In the case of the people that Dr. Moos talked about, this is accented by the fact that they spend a good deal of their time in armed forces' camps, so that the possibility of intermingling effects,

and therefore of effects flowing the other way, is to that extent minimized by the duration of tours and so forth. Nevertheless, given the kinds of dramatic break that take place in modernization problems, this may actually be a blessing in disguise, if you regard modernization as having any good side. This is the situation most likely to provoke antagonism, but it's also most likely to be effective, explicitly because flow the other way is regarded by the other side as out of the question.

This is not new in history. For example, the influence of the conquests of Alexander the Great was one-way. The changes were not so dramatic, not so far-reaching, as those taking place today, but they followed the same patterns.

Dr. Moos: We have not gone into the changes taking place among women — an important way of getting insights into acculturated processes. Here the civil code has been changed, and Family Courts were established three years ago. Now concubines must pay a fine if they are involved in alienation-of-affection suits. The whole change, in terms of new choices, presented to these individuals, is affecting the society much more than is commonly admitted by Korean scholars interested in acculturation.

Dr. Levy: To take the way back is impossible. You cannot restore traditional Korean society.

Dr. Moos: It's gone, period.

Dr. Dore: The question has been raised as to whether these developments are blessed developments or not. I want to ask you whether you think that the kind of economic developments in a boom town are likely to lead to internally-sustained economic growth in Korea. The things that you have mentioned so far seem on the whole to be not very great changes in terms of the evaluation of sex-or love-relationships. The increase in aspirations, of all the factors that tend to stimulate economic growth, is one of the easiest ones to develop. There is a question here whether the aspirations are not being raised too high. In other words, might it not be better to stimulate aspirations for radios and bicycles, things which are within the reach of the mass of the working population, rather than aspirations for the Sears and Roebuck type of product?

Secondly, you mentioned the stimulation of entrepreneurial activities, the laundrers, etc.

Now these are all exclusively of the tertiary kind, they're service-occupations. They are means devised for milking an economically more powerful class. I would have thought that if entrepreneurial activities are all directed into these channels, then the chances would be minimal of developing the kind of entrepreneurship which seeks to acquire new technological skill, which could be applied to the production of goods, which belongs in the category of secondary economic activities.

Thirdly, on this question of there being no way back, of the resentments which are caused by it being a one-way process — is it not possible that blockages will be diffused in the other channels of cultural contact, in intellectual channels and so on?

Dr. Moos: On the question of economics — though I'm not an economist — let me say that what is important is the accretion of a certain capital with which to work. If you just give land to a peasant, without at the same time giving him access to easy credit, you are not really getting land reform. As regards the tertiary aspect, I agree with everything you say, except that certain capital accumulation does take place in these areas, and the capital is then re-invested not only in service-connected activities, but also in more productive spheres. For example, among the Japanese, mizu-shobai girls buy stocks...

Dr. Levy: Forgive my interrupting. I'm not

an economist now, but I was once, and what you're saying couldn't be more naive economically.

I disagreed on the first day with a paper that maintained that, under the Yi dynasty, an entrepreneurial category, a craftsman category, was virtually negligible in terms of numbers — I'm sure that must have been an exaggeration. One thing is certain in all of these societies, that the development of an entrepreneurial class of any size, a class that thinks in terms of investment and increased productivity, — (and a boom-town always creates or enlarges such a class) — means that you get a class of trained people opportunistically looking for the main chance. These people are far from being uninterested in building up on the borders of these communities; sooner or later it will turn out to be immensely more sophisticated from an economic point of view to import some laundry machines. And quite apart from that, in the interim, you're playing to the doctrine of comparative advantage. The enormous comparative advantage vis-a-vis the U.S. that Koreans have is initially in service-goods. I don't care whether you call it exploitation it can ultimately have the effect of expanding the economy. The question is not whether you like it or not, but whether, if it is going to happen, you can so control and direct it so that it will be much more effective for the things you want; it is not a question whether you can eliminate it, and do other things entirely.

The Role of Entrepreneurs in the Modernization Process of Korea

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Introduction

1. Conception of modernization

Generally speaking, modernization is a process represented by the historical development of Western European countries since the Renaissance and the Reformation, and embraces the ideas, principles, and movements which are included in the process. According to the standard of Western European countries, the basic factors of modernization are substantially as follows.

- ① Establishing a democratic system in politics.
- ② Establishing a capitalistic system in economics.
- ③ Transference from handicraft to factory, techniques of science, and mechanization.
- ④ General operation of compulsory education.
- ⑤ Awakening of the individual consciousness, freeing it from the premodern way of thinking.

These five factors might be rephrased—according to Ernst Troeltsch's conception⁽¹⁾—into the following three items.

- ① Political factor: rational nationalism and democracy.
- ② Social, economical factor: capitalism and bourgeoisie.
- ③ Spiritual factor: natural science, rationalism, individualism.

In short, the modernization can be expressed as the movement of a nation which had been depressed under feudalism, to form a modern nation with the slogan of "scientification and democratization".

2. Modernization of the underdeveloped society

It seems unlikely that underdeveloped countries, including Korea, will necessarily trace their modernization along the same lines that the Western European society has experienced. This is because there are differences in the tempo, condition and content of historical process between the East and the West.

As is well known, in Western European society the collapse of the ancient society gave birth to the feudalistic one. Next, the newly raised bourgeoisie society succeeded in demolishing the feudalistic system and founded a modern society. Many factors in the history of Western Europe show concurrent development, and it is hard for us to find any co-existence of pre-modern with modern. Quite the contrary is true in the case of the underdeveloped society. Inevitable sharp conflicts arise between the new and the old, but the society remains stagnant, because traditional customs

(1) E. Troeltsch, *Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie*, 1925.